Gaining Customer Loyalty with Tracking Information Quality in B2B Logistics

2022 | Journal of Management Information Systems | Citations: 4

Authors: Rai, Arun; Tang, Xinlin; Yin, Zhitao; Du, Steven

Abstract: Although vendor firms invest heavily in technologies to digitalize business-to-b ... Expand

Abstract: Although vendor firms invest heavily in technologies to digitalize business-to-business (B2B) service orchestration, little is known about the mechanisms through which high quality information, a key resource generated from digitalization, creates customer loyalty. Positioning our work in the B2B logistics services context, we take a customer needs fulfillment perspective to understand value creation and capture from digitalization of service orchestration in B2B logistics relationships. We suggest that a vendor will capture exchange value, manifesting as customer loyalty, for the customer's perceived use value of the service enabled by tracking information quality on service orchestration. We propose that service flexibility and service efficiency provided by the logistics vendor are two types of use value for customers, which serve as the value-creation pathways through which tracking information quality affects customer loyalty, the exchange value received by the vendor. We further argue that service modal variety, a key aspect of service complexity, moderates the value-creation pathways of tracking information quality. Using survey and archival data of B2B relationships between a Fortune 100 logistics vendor and its major customers, we find empirical support for the use value mechanisms through which tracking information quality affects customer loyalty in the context of B2B logistics services. Collapse

Topics: customer loyalty logistics management data quality business-to-business supply chain management

Methods: survey instrumental variables estimation archival research descriptive statistic theory development

Theories: big five model

Contract Design Choices and the Balance of Ex Ante and Ex Post Transaction Costs in Software Development Outsourcing1

2016 | Management Information Systems Quarterly | Citations: 0

Authors: Benaroch, Michel; Lichtenstein, Yossi; Fink, Lior

Abstract: This paper examines multiple contract design choices in the context of transacti ... Expand

Abstract: This paper examines multiple contract design choices in the context of transaction and relational attributes and consequent ex ante and ex post transaction costs. It focuses on two understudied themes in the IT outsourcing literature. First, while the literature is predominantly concerned with opportunism and consequent ex post hazard costs that contracts can safeguard against, parties to a contract also economize on ex ante transaction costs by their choice of contract type and contract extensiveness. Second, the literature studies the aggregate extensiveness of contracts rather than of distinct contract functions: safeguarding, coordination, and adaptability. Against this backdrop, our research model portrays a nuanced picture that is anchored in the following theoretical interpretation: transaction and relational attributes have implications on specific ex ante and ex post transaction costs, and these implications can be balanced by respective choices in both contract type and the extensiveness of specific contract functions. These two contract design choices complement and substitute for each other in their ability to economize on specific transaction costs. Our analysis of 210 software development outsourcing contracts finds that explanatory power increases when analyzing the extensiveness of individual contract functions rather than the aggregate contract extensiveness, highlighting subtle competing influences that are otherwise masked by an aggregate measure. Our analysis also shows that a preference for time-and-material contracts counteracts the effect of certain transaction attributes on contract extensiveness, and even cancels it out in the case of transaction uncertainty. Collapse

Topics: systems development database system outsourcing business process management accounting

Methods: conceptual modelling descriptive statistic principal component analysis data transformation theory development

Theories: transaction cost economics

When Do Vendors Benefit from Relational Governance? Contracts, Relational Governance and Vendor Profitability in Software Development Outsourcing

2009 | International Conference on Information Systems | Citations: 0

Authors: Gopal, Anandasivam; Koka, Balaji R

Abstract: We examine the interacting effect of formal contracts and relational governance ... Expand

Abstract: We examine the interacting effect of formal contracts and relational governance on vendor profitability in the software outsourcing industry. We argue that the presence of relational governance is driven by perceptions of exchange hazards. In a departure from extant literature, we propose that its benefits depend on the manner in which exchange risks are shared. Specifically, we hypothesize that relational governance provides benefits to an exchange partner only in those contracts in which they are exposed to greater risk. We test these arguments by examining 105 software projects completed by a software vendor. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings. Collapse

Topics: outsourcing asset specificity IT project IT personell turnover accounting

Methods: survey company material data transformation descriptive statistic instrumental variables estimation